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3 *we will thereby show that both versions of the consequence argument fail.7
Now, in order to determine whether these inference rules are valid, we need to know more about what it means to "have a choice about" a proposition. In the next three sections, I consider three different ways of understanding this notion. The first two derive from van Inwagen; the third is my own. 7This is true provided, of course, that we do not rely on a counterexample to cx in which X doesn't exist. That is, if we were to criticize cx by appealing to a possible world in which every proposition is one that someone has a choice about, such a criticism would not tell against the Second Version of the Consequence Argument. But of course, no such criticism is in the offing here.
The Rendering-False Interpretation
According to van Inwagen, to say S has a choice about the fact that p is the same as to say that although p is the case, S can render p false. This, in turn, is equivalent to saying that although p, there is some action S can perform, his performance of which is sufficient for -p.8
What kind of "sufficiency" is involved here? Van Inwagen specifies logical sufficiency. At first glance, this seems to be a mistake, as it will give a far too restrictive account of what it is to have a choice about something. For instance, I might have a choice about the fact that Sara's phone won't ring at 11:00 tonight by virtue of the facts that I can call her up at 11:00 and that my doing so would cause her phone to ring at 11:00 tonight-even though my calling at this time would not be logically sufficient for the phone's ringing at this time. Van Inwagen could respond to this problem by allowing the (causal) consequences of an action to be built into a description of the action. Thus, it might be said that one of the actions I can perform is that of making Sara's phone ring at 11:00, my doing so being logically sufficient for Sara's phone to ring at 11:00, and that it is by virtue of this that I have a choice about whether Sara's phone rings at 11:00.
A second possibility is to use counterfactual sufficiency: that is, S can render p false (where p is some true proposition) iff S can perform some action, such that if he were to do so, it would not be the case that p.9 A third possibility is this: S can render p false (where p is some true proposition) iff S can perform some action, such that if he were to do so, S would thereby bring it about that -p.10
For his argument to succeed, van Inwagen need only find some S has free will and lives in an indeterministic world. S has access to a certain device that shoots R-particles into an R-particle basket. Given the current setup of the device, the basket, and their immediate environment, it is nomologically necessary that, if and only if the device is activated, an R-particle will be shot into the basket. However, the laws of nature do not determine, in the given setup, whether the R-particle would land in the left half of the basket or the right half. Which half the particle landed in, the laws say, would be a matter of chancethere being, if you like, a 50% probability of each; nevertheless, it is determined that the R-particle would definitely land in the basket. Neither S nor anyone else can alter the setup of the device in any way that would affect these facts. Whether the device is activated or not is determined by S's free choice. S decides not to activate the device, and no R-particle is emitted. for -A (that is, logically sufficient for an R-particle to land in the left half of the basket). The only relevant thing S can do is to activate the device, which obviously does not logically guarantee that an R-particle lands in the left half of the basket. If we allow the would-be causal consequences of this action to be built into descriptions of the action, then we can also say: S can shoot an Rparticle into the basket, and S can make it 50% likely that an Rparticle lands in the left half of the basket. But neither of these things is logically sufficient for an R-particle's landing in the left half of the basket either. Second, S cannot do anything that would be counterfactually sufficient for -A-it is not the case that if S were to activate the device, then an R-particle would land in the left half of the basket; rather, if S were to activate the device, an R-particle might or might not land in the left half of the basket. That is, in some of the nearby possible worlds in which S activates the device the R-particle enters the left half of the basket, and in some of the nearby worlds in which S activates the device the R-particle enters the right half instead. Third, a fortiori it is not the case that if S were to activate the device, then S would bring it about that an R-particle landed in the left half of the basket. Thus, S cannot render A false, for S cannot in any sense guarantee that an R-particle enters the left half of the basket.
By parity of reasoning, S cannot render B false either. However, S can render the conjunction of A and B false. The conjunction of A and B is simply the proposition that no R-particle enters the basket, and S can render this false in all three senses of 'can render false'. First, S can activate the device and thereby shoot an R-particle into the basket, and S's shooting an R-particle into the basket is logically sufficient for an R-particle's landing in the basket (hence, logically sufficient for - (A & B) ). Second, S can activate the device, and if S were to do so, it would not be the case that no R-particle entered the basket. And third, if S were to activate the device, S would thereby bring it about that an R-particle entered the basket (hence, bring it about that - (A & B) ). Once again, S has no choice about the fact that A, since he cannot render A false. In addition, S has no choice about the fact that (A D C). In order for S to be able to render (A D C) false, S must be able to do something, his doing which is sufficient for -(A D C). Now, -(A D C) is logically equivalent to (A & -C), which is logically equivalent to -B (if no particle lands in the left half of the basket, but a particle does land in the basket, it must land in the right half). S cannot do anything sufficient for (anything that would guarantee) the particle's landing in the right half of the basket. Therefore, S cannot do anything, his doing which is sufficient for -(A D C). Therefore, S cannot render (A D C) false.
However, S does have a choice about the fact that C, for, again, S can shoot an R-particle into the basket, and his doing so would be sufficient for -C. Thus, we have NA, N(A D C), but -NC, which is a counterexample to 1.14 The above criticism of rule P has an important virtue that is worth noticing: it does not depend on assuming that compatibilism is or might be true. Several other authors have made criticisms that do depend on such an assumption. In essence, they have argued that van Inwagen's argument begs the question against compatibilism, because if compatibilism is true, then some step of van Inwagen's argument is clearly mistaken (though they do not all agree on which step).15 Van Inwagen has, in my opinion, adequately rebutted this kind of charge. It is simply a consequence of the fact that van Inwagen's argument is an argument against compatibilism that, if compatibilism is true, then some step of his argument must The notion of having access to a world is a technical notion, so it is up to van Inwagen to define it as he chooses. One pitfall must be carefully avoided, however: it is possible that once the set of worlds S has access to is delineated, it will no longer be plausible that "having access" to possible worlds has anything to do with free will. Here is a trivial example of the potential problem: suppose we define the worlds S has access to to be just the nomologically possible worlds. In that case, it will seem that my having access to a possible but non-actual world has little to do with my having unexercised powers. For example, I would "have access to" worlds in which there are ten planets in the solar system. I would John's relation to B is the same as his relation to C-that is, he is no differently situated relative to Sally's possible choice to buy a bus ticket than he is relative to her possible choice to not buy a bus ticket (assume that John could not influence Sally's choice, once she received the dollar). John is in a position to give Sally the choice, but it is indeterminate which choice Sally would make if John were to do so: in some of the nearby possible worlds in which John gives her the dollar, she buys a bus ticket, and in some of the nearby worlds in which John gives her the dollar, she refrains. Thus, it would be arbitrary to say that John had access to the worlds in which B holds but not the ones in which C holds, or vice versa. John must have access either to both sets of worlds, or to neither. But we know John has access to some worlds in which A holds-this follows from the fact that he has a choice about whether to give Sally $1. Every A-world is also either a B-world or a C-world. So John must have access to some worlds in which either B or C holds. And so he must have access, both to the worlds in which B holds, and to the worlds in which C holds. This has the consequence that John has a choice about whether Sally buys a bus ticket (though Sally, herself, does not)19: In some of the worlds John has access to, she buys a ticket, and in some of the worlds he has access to, she doesn't. This is counterintuitive, since we have stipulated thatJohn couldn't influence Sally's choice once she had been given the dollar. (It is also, of course, incompatible with the result of defining 'has a choice about' in terms of 'can render false', but that is what we want, since we have abandoned the 'can render false' definition.)
We can generate a more strongly counterintuitive result using a second example:
Assume that both I and Mikhail Gorbachev have free will. At the present moment, I am deciding whether to drink a glass of milk or not. Shortly after I make this choice, Gorbachev will decide whether to take a walk or not. Neither of us, however, is able to exercise any influence on the other. I decide not to drink the glass of milk. Now, let D = I drink a glass of milk. E = I drink a glass of milk, and Gorbachev takes a walk. F = I drink a glass of milk, and Gorbachev refrains from taking a walk.
I have access to worlds in which D holds. Now, it seems that the same argument that showed that John had access to both the Bworlds and the C-worlds must also show that I have access to both the E-worlds and the F-worlds. Therefore, I have a choice about whether Gorbachev takes a walk or not (in some of the worlds I have access to, he takes a walk, and in some of the worlds I have 19Sally has no choice about whether John gives her the dollar. She has access to a world in which -A (the actual world), but she lacks access to any worlds in which A holds; therefore, she lacks access to any world in which either B or C holds. Of course, if John were to give her the dollar, she would then have access to such worlds. access to, he does not). But this is absurd-I clearly do not have any sort of control over Gorbachev. This shows that 'I have a choice about whether p' cannot be equated with 'In some of the possible worlds I have access to, p, and in some of the worlds I have access to, -p'.
But the following objection can be made to this last bit of reasoning. Unlike in the case of propositions B and C, there is a relevant distinction between E and F. Although E and F are both false, one of them has a second conjunct that is true. That is, either Gorbachev will take a walk in the actual world, or he won't. Let's stipulate that in the actual world,20 Gorbachev will take a walk. In that case, this very fact can be taken as a reason for saying that I have access to E-worlds but not F-worlds: S has access to a world only if the choices made by people other than S in that world are the same as the choices made by people other than S in the actual
It is in view of this sort of move that I introduced the first example. The first example shows that one must be allowed to "have access to" worlds in which other people make choices different from those made in the actual world-otherwise, John would have access neither to any B-worlds nor to any C-worlds, and so would not have access to any A-worlds. But John's relationship to the Bworlds in the first example, I claim, is relevantly similar to my relation to the F-worlds in the second example. John has no more control over Sally's choice than I have over Gorbachev's. The most that can be said, apropos of why John "has access to" worlds in which Sally buys a bus ticket, is that if John were to give Sally the dollar, she might buy a bus ticket. But it is also true that if I were to drink a glass of milk, Gorbachev might refrain from taking a walk. This is simply because it is already true that Gorbachev might or terexample to a and 3* presented in section 2. In that case, S can activate the device to shoot an R-particle into the basket. It is not the case that if S were to do so, no R-particle would enter the left half of the basket; rather, if S were to do so, an R-particle might enter the left half of the basket. Therefore, NsA is false. Similarly, NsB is false. Thus, no counterexample can be generated.
Moreover, it is easy to see that rules a-, 1, a-*, and 1* must be valid for Nsp as defined. Assume that for each act A that S can perform, in all the nearby worlds in which S performs A, p holds. Assume also that for each act A that S can perform, in all the nearby worlds in which S performs A, q holds. Then, obviously, for each act A that S can perform, in all the nearby worlds in which S performs A, both p and q hold. Therefore, rule 1* is valid. Rule cLt is also valid: assume that for every act A that S can perform, in will, then the only action I can perform is that of sitting here typing just these words on my keyboard. There is no danger that, in redefining 'NsP', we have made the argument irrelevant to free will. It is true that step 5 no longer means that S has no choice about the fact that P. Rather, step 5 says something logically stronger than that S has no choice about the fact that P. It says that no matter what S does, P would still hold, and this clearly entails that S lacks free will with respect to the fact that P.
The Plausibility of the Consequence Argument
In order for the above version of the Consequence Argument to prove that the existence of free will is incompatible with determinism, three conditions must hold. First, rules ot* and 13* must be valid. Second, the universal closure of Nsp must imply the absence of free will. Third, premises NsPo and NsL must be true, for any arbitrarily chosen person, S. As we have just seen, the first two conditions clearly hold when 'Nsp' is understood in the manner 29Fischer sympathetically discusses essentially this principle, which he calls "the fixity of the past" (see especially 78-85). Fischer's formulation is "no person can act in such a way that some fact about the past would not have been a fact" (9). Carl Ginet also defends a related "principle of the fixity of the given past" (On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 102-10). difference to the argument, so I conclude that if, in order for me to do A, a small miracle would have to have happened a short time ago, whereas no such miracle in fact happened, then I cannot now do A. Now a worry may arise that I have been unfair to Lewis. Lewis's claim, with respect to the imagined case where I am determined not to do A, was not that in order for me to do A, a certain divergence miracle would have to have happened a short time previously. Lewis's claim was rather that, if I were to do A, a divergence miracle would have happened a short time previously. The latter seems to be a weaker statement: for perhaps there are many different ways that I could have come to do A, but only one way that I would have. The way that I would have come to do A if I did is the way that involves the least deviation from the actual world, but (depending on how 'could' is read) the ways that I could have come to do A may be taken to include a great many more ways.
More generally: my principle is that if, in order for me to do A, B would have to have happened at some previous time, whereas in fact B did not happen, then I cannot do A. A soft determinist might deny that his position conflicts with this principle, because although, in order for me to do A, the past would have to have been different in some way, there is no event-type B such that, in order for me to do A, B in particular would have to have happened. Rather, there are many different past events that would do.
But this response gains no intuitive advantage, for I might just as well state the principle as follows: If, in order for me to do A, either B1 or B2 or ... or B, would have to have happened, whereas in fact none of {B1 ... Bnj happened, then I cannot do A. This principle can be supported by similar examples. Modify example (a) as follows: assume that in order to avoid the degradation of the ozone layer, we would have to have implemented at least one of twelve different policies, and done so some time between ten and twenty years ago. Assume that in fact, we implemented none of them. Again, it obviously follows that it is not now in our power to prevent the degradation of the ozone layer.
Similarly, suppose that, in example (b), there are three different ways of reviving a heart attack victim. Suppose that, in order to save the victim, either of the first two would have to have been applied within three minutes of the heart attack, or the third applied within three minutes and thirty seconds. Suppose that in fact, none of them was applied within the required time interval. Again, one could obviously infer that, at this point, the patient cannot be revived.
The general principle is that if, in order for one to do anything other than what one actually does, the past would have to have differed from the actual past, then one does not have free will. Lewis has not refuted this contention. He has distinguished between a strong and a weak sense of 'can render false', but to no effect, for he has said nothing to support the implausible assertion that one can render false a law of nature or a statement about the past, even in the weak sense. Thus, the Consequence Argument remains a very powerful argument for incompatibilism.
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